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JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR CONTRACTS
AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA LAW
I.

HERMAN STERNf

(Part I of this article begins on page thirty-two of Volume Five.')
V.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS UNDER PENNSYLVANIA

A.

LAW.

The Development and Nature of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.

THE DECLARATORY

JUDGMENT procedure initially suffered
the usual trials and tribulations of new developments in the law.' 4 5
Pennsylvania enacted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (hereinafter called "Declaratory Judgments Act", or simply "Act") in
1923.14" Since 1923, this Act has been thrice amended: once in 1935;
and twice again in 1943.'
The Act has also been further legislatively
supplemented by a statute enacted in 1935.148 At first the Pennsylvania
t Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law; Secretary, Section

on Industrial Relations, Pennsylvania Bar Association; Lecturer, United
States Department of Labor; International Orientation Center at St. John's
College; Member, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bars.
144. 5 VILL. L. Rnv. 32, 32-58 (1959). The last footnote in the initial half of
this article is numbered 143. For continuity and sequence, the first footnote herein
is accordingly numbered 144.
145. A scholarly and full analysis of the historical evolution of declaratory judgments in Pennsylvania will be found in the special commentary on declaratory judgments in Pennsylvania written by Professor A. Leo Levin, in PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12 (1953), introductory pages xv to xxxvii.
146. Act of June 23, 1923, P.L. 840, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 831-846 (1953).
PA. STAT. ANN. will hereinafter be cited as P.S. § (19-). The instant
citation would read: "12 P.S. §§ 831-846 (1953)." It is apropos, too, to note that
practically all states have enacted declaratory judgment statutes. The federal jurisdiction has its own act. See, 48 STAT. 995 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 22012202 (1954).
147. Act of April 25, 1935, P.L. 72, 12 P.S. § 836 (1953), which amendment was
enacted to clarify and ensure the optional aspect of declaratory judgment. Act of
April 13, 1943, P.L. 43, 12 P.S. § 848 (1953), which amendment goes to the right
of the petitioner making his own service and to related items. Act of May 26, 1943,
P.L. 645, 12 P.S. §§ 836, 847 (1953).
148. Act of May 22, 1935, P.L. 228, 12 P.S. 836, 847-853 (1953). This supplementary act provides, inter alia; that every proceeding shall be commenced by petition; that the petition may have an endorsement thereon to plead in fifteen days;
that there are certain requirements concerning service and return; that indispensable
parties may be joined; that defendants may raise preliminary questions of law
in lunine; and that parties may demand trial of fact issues by jury.
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courts construed the Act in a narrow and limited fashion. However,
declaratory judgment relief has been accorded more receptive and
liberal judicial treatment with the years. Judicial experience has indicated that a declaration of rights is extremely useful under certain
conditions. Then, too, the 1935 and 1943 amendments to the Act
served to confer upon the Act an unequivocal legislative blessing and
an expanded meaning which could not be gainsaid by the judiciary.
Perhaps the following summary comment by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania on the expanding application of the Declaratory Judgments Act best makes the point. With respect to this expanded applica49
tion, the court stated in Guerra v. Galatic:1
"... The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923, P.L. 840,
12 P.S. Section 831 et seq., as supplemented by the Act of 1935,
P.L. 228, 12 P.S. 847 et seq., was originally narrowly interpreted.
See Stofflet and Tillotson v. Chester Housing Authority, 346 P 4 .
574, 31 A.2d 274. However, following the amendment of 1943,
P.L. 645, 12 P.S. Section 836, the interpretation of the availability of the proceeding was greatly broadened. See Philadelphia
Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Rose, 364 Pa. 15,
70 A.2d 316. It is now accepted even though under the facts a
common law action might have been brought: Burke v. Pittsburgh
Limestone Corp., 375 Pa. 390, 100 A.2d 595."
Several additional factors have tended to accelerate the more
liberal approach by the courts in making declaratory judgment proceedings more readily available under Pennsylvania law. These include
the remedial nature of the Declaratory Judgments Act and the increasing acceptance of the Act by sister states and the federal jurisdiction.
The Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act is a remedial statute.
In this context the legislature has mandated the Pennsylvania courts
to construe and to administer the Act in a liberal fashion.1 5 ° In addition, the legislature has also directed that the Act be construed so as
to harmonize and make the Pennsylvania law uniform with the law
149. 185 Pa. Super. 285, 288, 137 A.2d 886, 888 (1958).
150. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 842 (1953). Section 842 expressly
mandates this rule of liberal statutory construction. Were this not so, the PENNSYLVANIA STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ACT, (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 501-602) would
require that the Declaratory Judgments Act be both liberally and strictly interpreted.
Provisions of the 1943 amendatory act would be liberally construed; and provisions
of the 1935 and 1923 acts strictly construed. For a discussion on this rule of construction involving prospective and retroactive interpretation and the "cut-off" date of
May 28, 1937, read Stern, The Background and Public Policy of Pennsylvania Law
on Collective Bargaining Agreements - Unshackling the Hold of the Common Law,
3 VILL. L. REv. 441, 447-448 (1958).
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in those states and in the federal jurisdiction which have enacted the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act."'
The nature of a declaratory judgment proceeding is by its name
self-explanatory. It involves nothing more, or less, than a declaration
with respect to "rights, status and other relations". In Pennsylvania
relief by declaratory judgment is limited to civil matters. The declaration in form and in result differs from the traditional coercive judgment or decree which can be executed upon for damages or enforced to
restrain or command performance. Matters subject to declaratory
relief, nonetheless, must be ripened to the point of "actual controversy",
or an issue indicating "inevitable and imminent litigation". The court
must be satisfied the proceeding will help terminate the uncertainty
or the controversy.
In examining the provisions of the Act itself one will find that the
stated scope of the Declaratory Judgments Act authorizes Pennsylvania
courts of record, in their jurisdiction:
"... to declare rights, status and other legal relations

....

The

declarations may be either affirmative or negative in form and
effect [and] . . . shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree. 1 2 . . . A contract may be 1' construed
either before or
53
after there has been a breach thereof.'

With reference to the power of the court to determine the question of construction or validity of instruments or legal relations the
Act further provides that:
"Any person interested under a . . . written contract, or other

writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other
legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, . . . may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument, statute . . . contract, . . .

and obtain a declaration of rights, or other legal relations there'1 54
under.'

Provision is made for jury trial of issues of fact, but failure to
demand a jury trial is treated as the equivalent of an agreement that
151. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 845 (1953). This provision is in
accord with general Pennsylvania law on statutory construction with respect to
uniform laws in other jurisdictions. See 46 P.S. § 557 (1952).
152. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 831 (1953).
153. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 833 (1953).
154. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. 832 (1953). Argument can be made
that the power of Pennsylvania courts to render declaratory judgments would seem
properly to extend to oral contracts. This is of importance in relation to labor contracts which ordinarily do not come within the purview of the Statute of Frauds:
Warren v. Motion Picture Operators Union, 383 Pa. 312. 118 A.2d 168 (1955).
Cf.. Moklofskv v. Moklofsky, 79 Cal. App. 259, 179 P.2d 628 (1947); Hohenberger
v. Schniter, 235 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1951).
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the proceedings will be heard by the court without a jury.'55 In such
case, the court has the power to determine all issues of fact, in addition
to questions of law.156
The judgment in a declaratory proceeding is in the form and has
the effect of a declaration. The judgment does not provide coercive
results. Where coercive relief is subsequently required supplemental,
legal or equitable remedies are available to the moving party. It must
be emphasized a declaration in favor of a petitioner will not, without
more, permit the petitioner to levy and execute thereon. So, too,
unlike a decree in equity, a declaration in favor of the petitioner will
not, without more, mandate injunctive relief.157
Why, then, declaratory judgment? The short answer is that due
to several remedial shortcomings the traditional coercive judgment and
decree failed to fill a gap which imperatively called for repair. Declaratory relief has helped remedy the deficiency in this respect. Actions at
law or suits in equity, on the whole, are considered prematurely brought
unless a legal wrong has been perpetrated. These traditional legal and
equitable actions and suits result in coercive judgments when they are
available. In many situations, however, the coercive relief of money
judgment or mandatory decree commanding or enjoining action is not
in order. Any situations, for example, which involve delicate continuing
relationships are in this area. It is far more desirable in situations
involving such continuing relations to determine legal rights under
declaratory judgment procedures before the wrong is actually committed, or prior to the time when the rights are actually violated.'5 8
This is especially the case in the field of labor relations. The unionemployer relationship is a complex, continuing one. It often involves
a multi-partite relationship which affects the separate interests or status
of many. It has impact not only on the union and the employerimmediate parties to the labor contract-but it also concerns and
affects the employee member or non-member, and third parties such
as sub-contractors.
155. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT. 12 P.S. § 839 (1953).
156. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 852 (1953).

Guerra v. Galatic,
185 Pa. Super. 385, 137 A.2d 886 (1958). Trials without juries in declaratory judgment proceedings are held pursuant to equity procedures, although declaratory
judgments are considered as legal and not equitable judgments. McCandless v. Burns,
377 Pa. 18, 104 A.2d 123 (1954) ; Melnick v. Melnick, 154 Pa. Super. 481, 36 A.2d

235 (1944).
157. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT,

12 P.S. § 838 (1953). Daniels Co. v. Nevling,

385 Pa. 276, 122 A.2d 814 (1956) ; Philadelphia Mfr's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rose, 364
Pa. 15, 70 A.2d 316 (1950).
158. The leading decision on "case or controversy" is Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346 (1911), wherein the United States Supreme Court held, inter alia,
that the judicial power "is the right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants ....
219 U.S. at 361.
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There is still another aspect of the continuity of the union-employer
relationship which is an important consideration. The labor contract
and the marital contract are akin in a limited sense by way of the
analogy. Both create a continuing relationship protected by law and
fostered by public policy. Legal battle and victory notwithstandingwin, lose, or draw,-the continuing relationship as a rule is not terminated by either victory or defeat relating to a matter in dispute. After
the fighting ceases, tumult and dislocation may continue rather than
abate. Thus, damages won by an employer for breach of a labor contract which still continues valid and subsisting may possibly result in
lasting scar tissue likely to plague the victor thereafter and forever
more. It is evident in such circumstances that a declaration of rights
which would decide, without more, the rights, status, or legal relationship of the parties would be wiser and better tailored for labor contract
enforcement than coercive judgment.
Lest the foregoing discussion be misinterpreted or misapplied, let
it be unequivocally noted that "justiciability" is a prerequisite for declaratory relief in Pennsylvania. In this sense the petition and thereafter
the trial of the cause must establish imminent legal hurt, uncertainty
and legal controversy, and a definite and concrete justiciable controversy which is ripe for judicial determination. If justiciability in the
foregoing sense is not shown, the Pennsylvania courts will refuse to
entertain the matter or give declaratory relief, just as they would refuse
to render advisory opinions in the traditional legal-equity actions
or suits.159
B. Prerequisitesand Standards for DeclaratoryRelief.
Although the Pennsylvania law on declaratory relief is relatively
new and its course not fully charted, some basic guideposts have been
established. The legislative standards set forth in the Declaratory Judgments Act have been judicially interpreted and applied so as to render
declaratory relief available, as follows:
(1) There must be a justiciable controversy. The court will therefore not render an advisory decision on hypothetical facts, 6 ' nor where
the proceedings prove academic, nor concern a declaration of future
159. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs ACT, 12 P.S. § 831, 836 (1953). See also, Silver
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 381 Pa. 41, 112 A.2d 84 (1955); McCandless Twp.
v. Wylie, 375 Pa. 378, 100 A.2d 590 (1954) ; Schoenbrun v. Nettrour, 368 Pa. 474,

61 A.2d 868 (1948).
160. For a detailed exposition of reasons why our courts will not render decisions
on hypothetical facts see the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Bell in McCandless
Twp. v. Wylie, 375 Pa. 378, 388, 100 A.2d 590, 595 (1954).
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rights which may never be in question. 6 ' Section 6 of the Act 62 provides an excellent outline of the conditions precedent for declaratory
judicial dispensation of relief, namely:
(a)

The determination of an "actual controversy," or

(b) where "antagonistic claims are presented between parties involved indicating imminent and inevitable litigation," or
(c) where there is assertion of "a legal relation, status, right, or
privilege" in which a party has a "concrete interest" and there
is a "challenge or denial" thereof by an adverse party who has
a like concrete interest, and declaratory judgment will "serve
to terminate the uncertainty or controversy."
(2) Declaratory judgment procedure is available in a particular
court where, and only in such case, the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter. " ' Such jurisdiction cannot be conferred solely by
agreement of the parties' and the court may, on its own motion, raise
16 5
the jurisdictional question despite an agreement of the parties.
(3) The availability of declaratory judgment relief is ordinarily
a matter of judicial discretion.' 66 This discretion cannot, however, be
exercised capriciously, arbitrarily or without limit.'6 7 Actually, the
matter resolves into reasonable decision as to which remedy, if there
is an election of more than one, will be most appropriate.' 68 One interesting reverse approach on this score is presented in White Oak
Borough Authority v. McKeesport 9 where the action was initiated by
161. Mr. Chief Justice Von Moschzisker pronounced the classic statement on
this score in Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 471, 131 Atl. 265, 271 (1925), when he
stated: ". . . jurisdiction will never be assumed unless the tribunal appealed to is
satisfied that an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one, exists between the
parties. . . ." Professor Levin, in the special commentary on declaratory judgments
in Pennsylvania, cited in note 145 supra, pithily comments on this classic statement
as follows: "This is picturesque phrasing; it is an apt figure for a requirement which
does not appear susceptible of hard and fast definition."
162. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 836 (1953).
163. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 831 (1953).
164. Cf., Valley R.R. v. Delaware and L. & W. R.R., 346 Pa. 579, 31 A.2d 276
(1943) ; Moorehead v. Northumberland Cty. Retirement Bd., 25 North. L.J. 223
(Pa. 1954).
165. Norwood Park Corp. v. Norwood Boro., 33 Del. 107 (C.P. Pa. 1945).
Cf., Nesbitt v. Mfr's Cas. Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165 Atl. 403 (1933) ; Taylor v.
Haverford Twp., 299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639 (1930).
166. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 831 (1953). Daniels Co. v.
Nevling, 385 Pa. 276, 122 A.2d 814 (1956) ; Eureka Gas. Co. v. Henderson, 371
Pa. 587, 92 A.2d 551 (1953).
167. Melnick v. Melnick, 145 Pa. Super. 564, 24 A.2d 111 (1954) ; Rose v.
Rose, 88 Pa. D. & C. 59 (C.P. Mtgmy. 1954). Cf., Lifter's Estate, 377 Pa. 277, 103
A.2d 676 (1954).
168. Lifter's Estate, 377 Pa. 277, 103 A.2d 676 (1954).
169. 379 Pa. 266, 108 A.2d 760 (1954).
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a complaint in equity. In the McKeesport case the plaintiff sought
clarification of certain rights under a written instrument. The court
dismissed the complaint because it found that "a full, adequate and
complete remedy is provided by law in the form of a declaratory
judgment."1 ° Plaintiff's failure in that case to pray for preliminary
injunction pending final determination of the cause helped persuade
the court to arrive at this result.
(4) Declaratory relief may be sought as an alternative procedure
even though the controversy could be resolved by another form of
action. The Declaratory Judgments Act, with respect to the court's
discretion to afford an alternative remedy in the form of declaratory
relief, expressly provides that:
"... the mere fact that an actual or threatened controversy is
susceptible of relief through a general common law remedy, or
an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy, whether
such a remedy is recognized or regulated by statute or not, shall
not debar a party from the privilege of obtaining a declaratory
judgment or decree where other essentials to such relief are
present .. ."171
Apropos this discretionary power of the court, declaratory relief has
been held to be available even though, under the facts of the case, a
common law action might have been instituted. 172 So, too, declaratory
relief can be partial relief only, despite the possibility that supplementary or independent proceedings may subsequently be called for or
needed to complete effectively the circle of relief for the litigant. 7
Judicial discretion to afford or refuse declaratory relief is not without
limitation. Although it is ordinarily within the discretion of the court
to determine whether jurisdiction will be taken in any particular case,
it has been heretofore indicated that a trial court will be reversed for
manifest abuse of discretion in refusing to entertain a declaratory
judgment proceeding.

7

4

(5) The courts cannot entertain declaratory proceedings where
statutory prescription provides for a "special form of remedy for a
170. Id. at 268, 108 A.2d at 761. In this action, the failure of plaintiff to apply
for interim injunctive relief pending the outcome of his case was fatal.
171. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 836 (1953).

172. Daniels Co. v. Nevling, 385 Pa. 276, 122 A.2d 814, affirming per curiam,
5 Pa. D.&C.2d 314 (C.P. Clear. 1956) ; Guerra v. Galatic, 185 Pa. Super. 285, 137
A.2d 886 (1958).
173. Daniels Co. v. Nevling, 385 Pa. 276, 122 A.2d 814 (1956); Philadelphia
Mfr's Mut. Co. v. Rose, 364 Pa. 15, 70 A.2d 316 (1950).
174. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AcT, 12 P.S. § 836 (1953).
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specific type of case." '
This approach is not only logical but is in
17 6
full accord with Pennsylvania law in general.
C. The Labor Contract and Declaratory Relief.
Declaratory relief is, within its limits and availability, eminently
suited for resolving a large area of oft-recurring controversies involving either the construction of the labor contract or the declaration
of rights thereunder. The remedial shortcomings of traditional coercive
legal or equitable remedies as to labor contract enforcement are glaringly apparent. First, the traditional forms of action are ordinarily
unavailable until the wrong has been committed. 77 Then, in addition,
the coercive relief afforded may result in negating the benefits otherwise resulting to the prevailing party to the labor contract. This,
unfortunately, is so because of the very nature of the relationships
created and thereafter ensuing as a result of a valid, enforceable labor
contract. In the continuing, and delicately balanced relationships between union, employer, and employee under the labor contract and in
the day-to-day employment contract, it is often imperative that legal
rights be determined prior to chancing a breach of contract. A victory
in the form of coercive relief may be costly because it triggers a
vendetta. On the other hand a declaration of rights, without more, may
afford a remedy without disastrous post-victory repercussions. And in
the case where the declaratory relief does not complete the circle of
relief, supplementary relief is available if necessary; even to the point
of effectuating the declaratory judgment or decree by coercive relief.' 78
Declaratory judgment is an eminently appropriate judicial remedy
under Pennsylvania law to determine the validity and construction of,
and the rights, status, and legal relations created by or arising under
collective bargaining agreements. Decisional law in Pennsylvania and
in other jurisdictions, including the federal jurisdiction, is in accord
175. Creasy v. Lawler, 389 Pa. 635, 133 A.2d 178 (1958); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Walker, 377 Pa. 396, 105 A.2d 363 (1954).
176. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 836 (1953). This rule is in accord
with Pennsylvania statutory mandate in general which provides that special statutory
remedies must be exclusively pursued and applied in both civil and criminal proceedings. See Act of March 21, 1806, P.L. 558, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46 § 156
(1952). See also, South Broad St. Corp. v. Philadelphia, 372 Pa. 557, 94 A.2d 772
(1953).
177. Equity ordinarily will not enjoin a possibly harmful act which is not
reasonably certain to occur. Curll v. Dairymen's Coop. Ass'n, 389 Pa. 216, 132 A.2d
271 (1957). One is nevertheless not required to await the occurrence of an irreparable
injury which is imminent and clearly impending. It is hornbook law in Pennsylvania
that equitable relief will be available in such latter event. But this is the exception
rather than the rule.
178. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 838 (1953). Daniels Co. v.
Nevling, 385 Pa. 276, 122 A.2d 814 (1956) ; Philadelphia Mfr's Mut. Fire ins. Co.
v. Rose, 364 Pa. 15, 70 A.2d 316 (1950).
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on this point. In this respect it is interesting to note that the declaratory judgment procedure was involved in one of the most dramatic
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States during the
179
first half of this century, United States v. United Mine Workers.
The Mine Workers case is essentially labelled as a "contempt" case.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States held in that case
that the federal Declaratory Judgment Act provided a proper vehicle
for a declaration on the legal validity of a unilateral termination by the
union of the so-called "Krug-Lewis" labor agreement entered into
80
between the United States and the union.1
Pennsylvania courts have applied declaratory judgment relief in
the determination of the validity and construction of the labor agreement. Thus, in O'Donnell v. City of Philadelphia,"" a declaratory
judgment proceeding determined the alleged rights of non-union employees, in relation to a city ordinance, to obtain the benefits of a labor
contract. So, too, in American Federation of State Employees Council
No. 33 v. Philadelphia,"2 the court determined the validity and impact
of certain provisions of a labor contract.
Three caveats are appropriate at this point, namely:
(1) Procedural requirements of the Declaratory Judgments
Act should be observed; (2) statutes have been enacted which mandate that an administrative agency rather than the courts will have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine certain rights and liabilities
which are known as "public rights"; and (3) where special
statutory remedies have been provided, such remedies are exclusive
and must be applied for specific types of cases. The following
cases in each of these three cautionary areas may be helpful.
Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse Corporation...
is a case in point on the procedural requirements of the Declaratory
Judgments Act. In Federation of Salaried Unions the union joined
with individual members in a "spurious" class action permitted by.
the PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, and filed a complaint
for a declaratory judgment determining overtime payments for overseas
duties under a labor agreement. The Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act expressly provides that "Every proceeding for a declaratory
judgment shall be commenced by a petition .
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

330 U.S. 258 (1947).
Id. at 265-266.
385 Pa. 189, 122 A.2d 690 (1956).
83 Pa. D. & C. 537 (C.P. Phila. 1952).
7 Pa. D.&C.2d 281 (C.P. Alleg. 1956).

184.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

. ."

(emphasis added).'

ACT. 12 P.S. § 847 (1953).
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Preliminary objections were sustained because the proceeding had been
initiated by complaint instead of by petition as required by the Declaratory Judgments Act.
A decision illustrating the second caveat relating to exclusive
jurisdiction is Kohv v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board.l" 5 The
labor board in Pennsylvania is given the exclusive power to prevent
unfair labor practices.' 8 Labor contracts which are the fruits of unfair
labor practices therefore must fall. The Kohv case involved such a
contract. An employee was summarily dismissed for union activities
during an organized campaign. Subsequently, the employer recognized
the union as the bargaining representative. As a quid pro quo, the
union settled the representation controversy by agreeing to the discharge
of the employee and absolving the employer from any repercussions
insofar as remedying the unfair labor practice. The court held that
this contract settlement absolving the employer from liability for the
discharged employee, was invalid and unenforceable as against public
policy. The determination as to whether a contract is against public
policy is a question of law which is for the court to decide based on
the facts of each case.
A case illustrating the application of special statutory remedies to
specific cases is Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Walker,"7 where mandamus instead of a declaratory proceeding was held to be the proper
remedy to compel the Secretary of Labor to promulgate railroad
safety rules.
The Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act encourages uniform
interpretation and application of the statute. The Pennsylvania courts
are urged to establish accord and rapport with the construction of the
Declaratory Judgments Acts by sister states and by the federal jurisdiction.' 8 Courts in other jurisdictions have held that declaratory
relief is appropriate to determine rights, status and other legal relationships arising under labor contracts. Thus, an employer's suit in a
federal court for declaratory judgment to determine the arbitrability of
union grievance claims for compensation during a period of injury, has
been held to be properly instituted.8 9 Another such suit in a federal
court related to the issue of whether an alleged existing labor contract
185. 6 Pa. D.&C.2d 250 (C.P. Mtgy. 1955). C1. Local 492 v. Schauffler, 162
F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1958) ; Phillips v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 362
Pa. 78, 66 A.2d 227 (1948).
186. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 43 P.S. § 221.8 (1952).
187. 377 Pa. 396, 105 A.2d 363 (1954).
188. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 12 P.S. § 845 (1953).
189. Pittsburgh Rys. v. Street Elec. Employees of America, Division 85, 176
F. Supp. 16 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
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or a former labor contract was valid.' 90 State courts in sister states,
in like manner, have entertained declaratory judgment proceedings
with respect to rights, status or other legal relations under or affected
by a labor contract. 9 '
Despite its availability and suitability in determining the rights,
status and legal relations arising from a labor contract, resort to
declaratory relief has not been frequent. The short answer explaining
the dearth of judicial declaratory determination in this area of the law
would seem to be based on two reasons. First, declaratory judgment
is a relatively new form of action and is relatively unfamiliar to the legal
profession. More important, however, is the growing impact of labor
arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements as adjustment
machinery for the settlement of disputes. A final and binding decision
by arbitration award usually terminates the controversy. All but the exceptional labor contract of this day provide for settlement of contract
term disputes by final and binding arbitration. Exhaustion of the arbitration contract remedies is generally imposed by the law as a condition precedent to qualifying for judicial relief, absent proof of fraud
or collusion.
VI.
THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS AND INDIVIDUAL ENFORCEMENT OF
RIGHTS UNDER

OR AFFECTED BY THE LABOR AGREEMENT.

A. The Merger of Individual Rights
into the Group Interest.
"Every sweet has its sour . . . and for everything

you gain, you lose something. ..."
RALPH WALDO EMERSON,

Essay on Compensation.
The world trend in all areas of human activities and relationships
during the last three decades, has been in the direction of merger of
individual rights into the amalgam known as the "common interest,"
the "group interest" or the, more euphonious, "public interest."'9 " This
190. Kennametal, Inc. v. International Union, U.A.W., AFL-CIO, 161 F. Supp.
362 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
191. El Paso Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Texas Highway Comm., 231
S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.) rev'd on other grounds, 149 Tex. 457, 234 S.W.2d
857 (1950) ; Christiansen v. Local 680, 126 N.J. 508, 10 A.2d 1108 (1940).

192.

LLOYD, LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE 20TH CENTURY

102-03 (1959),

wherein the author states: "And with the recognition that the law may be required
in the interest of society to intervene at almost every point of human activities grew
the realization that not only was there no automatic solution of human conflicts by
the merger of the individual in the common interest but that on the contrary perhaps
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trend is especially evident to the student of American and, more particularly, Pennsylvania labor law.
. The big depression which began in 1929 and the immediately
following years of lean pickings mandated an acceleration in recognizing and solidifying these group rights. In the field of labor relations, the choice seemed to narrow down to an election between
modifying our free enterprise system by fostering collective bargaining
or the alternative of accepting fascistic or communistic economic control. Effective collective bargaining via strong labor unions was encouraged by national policy, in order to provide pump-priming of
consumer purchasing power-the antidote to counteract the creeping
paralysis of a crippled economy atrophying because of lack of such
consumer purchasing power. Pennsylvania, in 1937, by legislative
promulgation, adopted the national policy with respect to collective
bargaining. Beginning with 1937, and without change since then, the
public policy of Pennsylvania has been four square and unequivocally
for the encouragement of both collective bargaining and, as well, the
consummation and enforcement of the resultant collective bargaining
agreement.1 93 The consequent material gains on the national and on the
Pennsylvania level to individual employees and to the economy as a
whole cannot be gainsaid.
But the law of compensation must assess its inexorable "pound of
flesh." In this case, the piper is perforce sometimes paid with loss of
individual rights which would otherwise have remained undisturbed
and inviolate. The merger of certain rights of the individual employee
into group interests has its advantages, but it also has some inherent
disadvantages. While the author believes that the good accomplished
by collective bargaining far outweighs the disadvantages, delicate and
fundamental issues are nonetheless posed. The individual employee's
interests, it is true, are by and large in harmony with, parallel to, and
served by interests of the bargaining unit and the labor union. But
at times these individual interests run counter to, or even clash violently
with, the group interest. This is the delicate area of conflict which has
engendered real concern and differences of opinion by the judiciary in
the several jurisdictions.'
the fundamental problem of our times is the clash between the public interest and
the interests of the individual citizen." This is cited in 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 79, 82
(1959).
193. See, Stern, The Background and Public Policy of Pennsylvania Law on
Collective Bargaining Agreements - Unshackling the Hold of the Common Law, 3
VILL. L. Rev. 441 (1958).
194. A good general analysis of this problem will be found in Cox, Individual
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreement, 8 LAB. L.J. 850 (1958). See also,
Cox, Rights under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. Rev. 601 (1956); Gregory,
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Some of the more important areas which will be explored in the
following sections are: The nature and impact of majority rule; the
prerequisites for bringing an individual suit; and the forms of actions
available.
B. Majority Rule and Individual Enforcement.
The National Labor Relations Act and the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Act.. 5 both provide that an employer shall bargain exclusively with the majority representative on the mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining. The area of mandatory collective bargaining is
for practical purposes all-encompassing and includes "rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.' 9 6
A certification of a labor union is effective for at least one year except
under unusual circumstances. By virtue of so-called "contract-bar"
rules administratively created by the respective Pennsylvania and
National Labor Boards, and approved by the courts, the expiration
period of the labor contract is usually the only opportunity for a redetermination of the bargaining representative. Finally, under majority
rule a union member is held to have designated the union as his agent,
and he is ordinarily bound "lock-stock-and-barrel" by the provisions of
the labor agreement. All of these factors, of course, militate against
individual determination or individual enforcement of the terms of the
labor agreement.
The comman law's approach, too, is somewhat unsympathetic
in permitting individual enforcement of labor contracts by the courts;
and Pennsylvania is a great common law state. The common law
approach to the usual employment contract is that it is terminable at
the will of either the workingman or the employer. Then, too, there
are technical pleading and procedural problems insofar as individual
enforcement of a labor agreement is concerned. The union involved
and the employer are, eo nominee, the actual parties to the labor agreement. Even though the terms of the labor agreement may be for the
benefit of the member, the member is not an actual party, eo nominee,
to the labor agreement. A decision in 1930, prior to Pennsylvania's
adoption of the Restatement of Law's third party donee beneficiary
rules, decisively makes this point. Babbit v. Wilmer and Vincent, Inc.
Fiduciary Standards and the Bargaining and Grievance Procedure, 8 LAB. L.J. 843
(1957) ; Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor, 45 CORN. L.Q. 25 (1959).
195. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 61 STAT. 136 C1947) as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-168 (1952); PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 43 P.S. §§ 211.1211.13 (1952).
196. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, § 9(a) supra, note 196; PENNSYLVANIA
LABOR RELATIONS AcT, § 9(a) supra, note 196. The Phraseology in both statutes
is identical.
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thus held that a union member was barred from being the plaintiff
in an action to enforce wages due him under a contract which the
court found was "made for the benefit of the members of the union. "197
On the other side of the coin is of course the basic guarantee of
the right to earn a living. This is a fundamental right which has
recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
MacDonald v. Feldman, namely: "The right to engage in remunerative
employment is a valuable right . . . and an improper interference with
it is answerable in a common law action in trespass . . [or] in
equity ... ,19

Another development in emphasizing the rights of individual
employees has been recent judicial demarcation of those rights under a
labor agreement which accrue to the uniquely personal benefit of the
individual employee in contradiction to those benefits which flow
directly to the union. In Association of Westinghouse Employees v.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation,'99 the landmark case on this point,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that a union could not sue,
under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, for wages of its members
pursuant to a labor contract. The basic ground of the holding by the
majority was that Section 301 did not permit an action by a union to
enforce uniquely personal rights of its members.
There is yet a third recent development which can be argued in
favor of some limited legal right of the individual to enforce his
employment rights pursuant to terms of a labor agreement. In Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway Employees v. Pittsburgh
Railway Company,2"' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a
labor contract is a trade agreement rather than a contract of employment. Although the individual employee's contract of employment
therefore necessarily adopts the terms of the labor agreement, it is by
the same token an agreement separate and apart from the labor
20
agreement itself. '
One may well query as to the significance and impact of these
developments and rules of law. Where do the trails lead? Can one
strike a fair and practical balance between individual rights on the
one hand and the collective interest on the other? It would seem, in
197. 14 LH. L.J. 94 (C.P. Pa. 1930).
198. 393 Pa. 274, 277, 142 A.2d 1, 3 (1958).
199. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
200. 393 Pa. 219, 142 A.2d 734 (1958). The rule of the leading federal decision
on tile nature of a collective bargaining agreement, J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332 (1942), was adopted in the Amalgamated Ass'n case.
201. A detailed discussion of this point may be found in Stern, Pennsylvania Law
on the Nature and Theory of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 32 TEtma. L.Q.

29, 50-52 (1958).
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summarizing, that an employees rights which stem initially from
the terms of a labor contract should be governed by the remedies
provided in the contract itself. The union and the employer are the
parties to the labor contract. Therefore, the union and not the employee,
except for the most atypical circumstances of fraud, conspiracy or
caprice, should be the proper party to pursue the rights thereunder.
The author is aware that this proposed approach would seem to fly in
the face of the Westinghouse case2 °2 doctrine that uniquely personal
rights belong to and may be enforced by the individual member. But
one must remember that this Westinghouse case was decided partly
on the ground that, as a non-diversity action, federal courts in entertaining the cause under the statute might run afoul of the constitutional
bounds of federal judicial jurisdiction as limited by Article III, Section 2 of the federal Constitution. In any event, the dissent by Mr.
Justice Douglas, rather than the majority of opinion, is more in tune
with the spirit of collective bargaining insofar as this author views it.
Mr. Justice Douglas held, among other things that: "What union
obtains in the collective agreement it should be entitled to enforce or
defend. . . ." Contract enforcement by individuals of their employment rights, on the other hand, should be afforded by courts in exceptional cases where the union has-capriciously, fraudulently, or by
corrupt agreement with the employer or with other employees-refused
to vindicate rights of or failed to seek redress for the wrongs to an individual member pursuant to terms of a valid labor agreement. In
two cases decided by Pennsylvania trial courts, the union has been
accorded the right to bring suit on behalf of either itself or its members to enforce uniquely personal rights under a labor agreement.20 3
This is as it should be. It must be emphatically added, and it will be
later developed in some detail, that this does not prevent actions at law
by the individual employee for damages to enforce rights which stem
from the labor agreement.
C. Theories Permitting Enforcement of the
Labor Contract by Individual Employees.
In Pennsylvania, judicial enforcement of the labor contract by
individuals is premised on one of two theories: the third party donee
beneficiary theory or the agency theory.
202. Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955).
203. International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 7 Pa.
D.&C.2d 290 (C.P. Mercer 1956); Federation of Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 7 Pa. D.&C.2d 281 (C.P. Alleg. 1956).
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(1)

The Third Party Beneficiary Theory:

One of the problems involved in a suit by an individual employee
arises in part because the individual employee is not eo nominee a party
to the labor contract, although the contract was consummated for his
benefit as well as for the benefit of others in his group. Prior to 1931,
Pennsylvania law on third party beneficiaries would have barred such
an employee from bringing an action to enforce his benefits under the
contract. Since 1931, when the leading case of Commonwealth v.
Girard Indemnity Company20 4 was decided, the Pennsylvania courts
have adopted the donee beneficiary rules of the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts. Chernko v. Moore 5 cites four of the more pertinent sections of the Restatement on this score, namely:
Section 133:
"(1) Where the performance of a promise in a contract will
(a) a
benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is ....
donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in
view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the
promise ... is... to confer upon him a right against the promissor
to some performance neither due or supposed or asserted to be
due from the promisee to the beneficiary."
Section 135:
"(a) A gift promise in a contract creates a duty of the
promissor to the donee beneficiary to perform the promise; and
the duty can be enforced by the donee beneficiary for his own
benefit; ...."
Section 139:
"It is not essential to the creation of a right in a donee
beneficiary ... that he be identified when a contract ... is made."
Section 345 (1) (b):
"[T]he donee beneficiary can get judgment for the value of
the promised performance, with interest. .. ."
In O'Donnell v. City of Philadelphia,"6 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recently entertained a third party donee beneficiary suit for the
enforcement of labor contract rights by municipal employees who were
not members of the union. The action was dismissed on the merits.
The court found that the employer and the union had not intended, in
fact the contract had provided expressly to the contrary, that these
suing employees should be beneficiaries. Pennsylvania third party
204. 321 Pa. 183, 167 Ati. 793 (1933).
205. 64 Pa. D. & C. 638, 639 (C.P. Fayette 1948).
206. 385 Pa. 176, 122 A.2d 690 (1956).
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beneficiary law, in this respect, requires that both parties to a contract
must have contemplated the existence of, and intended a benefit to, a
donee beneficiary.20 7 Where this standard is not met, third parties are
deemed merely incidental beneficiaries without cognizable justiciable
rights. The court held in Chernko v. Moore211 that an employee member of a union, as a third party donee beneficiary, may bring an action
for wages due him according to a labor contract wage schedule.

(2)

Agency Theory:

The agency theory proceeds on the rationale that a union is the
agent of its members; and that the union-employer labor contract is
the member's contract and the terms thereof are binding upon the
member. This agency theory also embraces employees who are engaged
to work in the bargaining unit subsequent to the date of execution
of the labor agreement by application of the contract theory of ratification. Duquesne Brewing Company v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review 09 and Povey v. Midvale Steel Company2 1 are two
Pennsylvania cases, among many, most frequently cited for the agency
theory.

(3)

Employee Election of Agency or Donee Beneficiary Theory:

The foregoing discussion has developed the fact that Pennsylvania
law permits an individual employee's judicial enforcement action of a
labor contract to proceed on the donee beneficiary theory and on the
agency theory. Miller v. Johnstown Traction Company2 . holds that
the election of the theory upon which the employee's action is based is
solely the employee's choice. The averments of the pleadings accordingly will determine the theory of the action. Hence, where the individual employee union member plaintiff averred in the Johnstown
Traction Company case that his union was the collective bargaining
agent of plaintiff, the member was held bound by this allegation and the
court applied the agency theory.
207. Isbrandsten Co. v. Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204
F.2d 495 (1953); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Warfel, 5 Pa. D.&C.2d
695 (C.P. Lanc. 1955).
208. Chernko v. Moore, 64 Pa. D. & C. 638 (C.P. Fayette 1948).
209. 359 Pa. 535, 59 A.2d 913 (1948) ; Accord, Prenctice Unemployment Compensation Case, 161 Pa. Super. 630, 56 A.2d 295 (1948).
210. 175 Pa. Super. 395, 105 A.2d 172, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954).
211. 167 Pa. Super. 421, 74 A.2d 508 (1950).
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D. Federal Preemption and the Right of
Individual Enforcement by the Courts.
Where a complete and adequate administrative remedy is provided
by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, Pennsylvania has
recognized that its courts are barred from taking jurisdiction over the
subject matter unless concurrent jurisdiction is expressly ceded by
Congress.212 The problem arises especially in determining those situations where the plaintiff contends that remedies under the National
Act are not adequate. Apropos the subject matter under present
consideration in this respect is the issue as to whether damages for all
tortious conduct, including tortious conduct within the definition of
"unfair labor practices" under the National Act, still remains within
the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts. United Construction Workers
2 13 is a leading tort action
v. Laburnum Construction Corporation
where the plaintiff claims inadequate remedy under the National Labor
Relations Act. In the Laburnum case, an interstate employer sued a
labor union in a state court in tort for damages. The conduct complained of, marked by violence and threats, also constituted an unfair
labor practice. The Supreme Court of the United States held in the
Laburnum case that the traditional law of torts and the legislative
intent in the National Labor Relations Act would permit a state court
to award damages. The rationale of the Laburnum case was two-fold;
first, that the remedies provided by the National Labor Relations Act
were prospective and did not compensate for past damages. Finally, the
dominant interest of the state in the public welfare and safety would
not be gainsaid unless Congress provided expressly to the contrary." 4
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of San Diego
21
Building Trades Council v. Garmon

5

21
and several other decisions

n

which have followed, unequivocally hold that the National Labor Relations Board has primary jurisdiction over non-violent tortious conduct
protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act. State
courts are required to honor this primary jurisdiction and are accordingly precluded from entertaining litigation involving such non-violent
tortious conduct.
212. Garner v. Teamster Union, 346 U.S. 485, affirming, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d
893 (1953).
213. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
214. Ibid.
215. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
216. DeVries Elec. Workers Local 426 v. Baumgartner's Elec. Constr. Co.,
359 U.S. 498 (1959); Grocery Drivers Union Local 848 v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.
of Los Angeles, 359 U.S. 434 (1959).
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The recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of MacDonald v.
Feldinan17 would therefore appear to be incorrectly decided. This
case involved a tort action sounding in trespass. A blouse machine
operator brought suit against a union and its officer to recover damages
as a result of an alleged wrongful and malicious interference with
her employment. Although the plaintiff was not a member of that
union, she alleged that the union threatened to call a strike against her
interstate employer in the event he refused to discharge her. She alleged
that as a result her employment was terminated. The majority opinion
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the MacDonald case affirmed
a cause of action on what would appear to be an erroneous application
of the rationale of the Laburnum case. The majority opinion is
presumed on the traditional jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts to
prevent and compensate for the unjustified interference with the right
to engage in gainful employment. Mr. Justice Cohen, in the MacDonald
dissent, correctly argued that the reach of the Laburnum case rule is
overextended by the majority by permitting Pennsylvania courts to
assume primary jurisdiction in all tort cases, including those involving
as the MacDonald case did non-violent tortious conduct otherwise
within the preempted purview of the National Labor Relations Act.
Benjamin v. Foidl"t 8 is another case, involving the same problem,
which would appear to have been incorrectly decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because of an apparent predilection to afford
damages in tort actions arising in the context of labor relations.
E. The Requirement To Exhaust Labor Contract Remedies.
Judicial enforcement of a labor contract should not be available
as an optional substitute for otherwise adequate remedies and machinery
of settlement provided in a labor contract. Any standard less demanding than such exhaustion of internal remedies is out of step and out
of tune with the spirit of collective bargaining and the need for continuity in employer-union relationship. The labor contract of this day,
almost without exception, provides for a grievance procedure and for
arbitration of disputes as the terminal extra-judicial final and binding
procedure. An action at law or suit in equity to resolve disputes
arising under a labor contract should be dismissed as being premature
where there has been a failure first to resort to and exhaust such
contract grievance and arbitration procedure.
217. 393 Pa. 274, 142 A.2d 1 (1958).
218. 379 Pa. 540, 108 A.2d 300 (1954).
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The rule of exhaustion of internal remedies is not a novel one in
the law.21 It makes particularly good sense in its application to enforcement by the individual of rights under labor contracts for a number of reasons. First, many of the rights in dispute, which never
existed nor were dreamed of at common law, are the sole creation of
the parties to the labor agreement. Certainly the employee is not such
a party, eo nominee. Let us examine seniority benefits in this sense.
Seniority rights are created solely by contract. These rights do not
exist under common law as part of the individual employment contract. Secondly, exhaustion of contract remedy affords stability and
orderliness to the union-employer relationship. This is precisely what
the parties agreed to in consummating the contract. Thirdly, there is
the statutory scheme to consider as encompassed by the basic public
policy of encouraging collective bargaining under a system of free
enterprise. Judicial enforcement of alleged labor contract rights without requiring exhaustion of the internal remedies obviously runs counter
to this concept. Finally, the vast body of general and procedural law
is in harmony with the exhaustion of remedy approach.
A search for Pennsylvania appellate decisions directly on point
involving exhaustion of remedies has been largely unproductive. The
general rules of law previously discussed herein under the heading
"Majority Rule and Individual Enforcement," are consonant with the
"exhaustion" principle. Thus, it has been held that an existing labor
contract between unions and employer is part of the union member's
employment contract.2 2 ° Members of the union are, by the same token,
bound by the labor agreement comprehending all aspects of the labormanagement relationship, which in turn includes the adjustment of
disputes arising under the labor contract. 2 ' This is an incident of
membership in the union.222 The case of Mack Manufacturing Company v. United Automobile Workers,223 while not precisely on point
because enforcement was not pressed by individual members, nonetheless supports this "exhaustion" approach by analogy. In the Mack
Manufacturing case, a collective bargaining agreement provided for
219. Adjudication by way of administration process, for example, is extra-judicial
process which by analogy is akin to the extra-judicial process of collective bargaining.
The requirements of exhaustion of administrative process before judicial relief can be
available is treated in DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT 356-71 (1959).
220. Kern v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 17 Pa. D.&C.2d 299 (C.P. Alleg.), aff'd
per curiam, 396 Pa. 279, 152 A.2d 682 (1959) ; Povey v. Midval Co., 175 Pa. Super.
395, 105 A.2d 172, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954).
221. Ibid.
222. For citations of a number of Pennsylvania cases directly on point see Stern,
Pennsylvania Law on the Nature and Theory of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
32 TEMP. L.Q. 29, 49-53 (1958).
223. 368 Pa. 37, 81 A.2d 562 (1951).
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arbitration of any unsettled grievances concerning layoffs and seniority.
A complaint in equity seeking to dismiss the arbitration proceedings
concerning an unsettled layoff grievance was filed by the employer.
The complaint was dismissed on the rationale that arbitration proceedings, as required by the labor contract, had not been exhausted.
Following this principle to its inevitable conclusion, where the union
has acted in good faith and has exhausted the contract machinery
although without satisfactory result to the individual employee, the
case of Capecci v. Capecc. 24 holds that the dissatisfied individual employee cannot thereafter be heard to complain. The Pennsylvania
courts, in such event, will refuse to entertain a subsequent legal action
brought by the employee to vindicate his alleged rights pursuant to
the terms of a labor contract.
F. The Prerequisitesof Ripeness, Primary Jurisdiction,
Inclusion in Unit, and Indispensable Parties.
(1 ) Ripeness.
Unless a dispute has ripened into a justiciable controversy Pennsylvania courts cannot grant relief. Advisory opinions will not be
given. The matter, to be ripe for judicial review, must involve the
classic concept of "case or controversy." The courts thus will hold
that an action is premature if it involves merely a legal opinion--or in
other words-a decision relating to the expectation of possible events
which may in fact never materialize. This entire concept, needless to
elaborate, is much easier to formulate as a rule of law than to apply
in the context of disputed facts. Suffice it to note that reasonable men
will differ in the application of the rule as to when the imaginary line
has been crossed into the no man's land separating an advisory opinion
from a decision involving "case or controversy." Gavigan v. Bookbinders Union No. 97,"' is a case which decides precisely this point of
the prerequisite of "ripe" dispute. In the Gavigan case, union members
filed an equity proceeding to determine and protect their seniority
rights. No damage had been suffered by employees as of the time of
filing the action. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the action must fail because it was prematurely
instituted. One of the cornerstones of the Gavigan decision was the
determination that the employee plaintiffs had not to that date suffered
224. 11 Pa. D.&C.2d 459, (C.P. Phila.), aff'd per curiam, 392 Pa. 32, 139 A.2d

563 (1958).
225. 394 Pa. 400, 147 A.2d 147 (1959).
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a legally redressable "hurt" as a result of the alleged improper interpretation of the seniority provision in the labor contract. Bonanno v.
Murray Corporation of America226 deals with an analogous problem
involving, in a sense, "ripeness." In this case a probationary employee
filed an action in assumpsit seeking to recover lost earnings for a
discharge allegedly based upon improper grounds under a labor agreement. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held, inter alia, that the
purpose of probationary employment was to give the employer an
opportunity to determine the fitness of an employee. Hence, the action
by this probationary employee would necessarily be premature and the
court found that it presented no justiciable controversy.
(2)

Primary Jurisdiction.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies
are at the same time both akin and different. Each of these two doctrines is concerned with the element of timing or of proper sequence.
They are distinguishable in the sense that exhaustion of remedy controls
the timing of review as to the stage of the intra-party procedure which
must first be exhausted prior to judicial review. Primary jurisdiction,
on the other hand, determines whether the courts, without prior extrajudicial procedure, can initially entertain the action.
The "primary jurisdiction" problem in labor matters usually arises
where statutory prescription directs that initial proceedings shall be
commenced in an administrative or extra-judicial forum. In such cases
courts must refuse to entertain initial action on that score.
Wagner v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers22 7 is
a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which
recognizes and applies the primary jurisdiction rule. In the Wagner
case, a former railroad employee instituted an equity action against his
union for damages for wrongful discharge under the labor agreement
and for reinstatement in the union. The court affirmed the dismissal
of the action. As to reinstatement the Wagner decision held:
if **However, in considering the other matter involved here
we find that plaintiff is seeking reinstatement into the Union, as
a result of which it becomes necessary to interpret his right under
the agreement between the defendant Railroad and defendant
Union. In this situation this case comes directly within the decision
set forth in the case of Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339
U.S. 239, 70 S. Ct. 557, 94 L.Ed. 795, holding that disputes,
226. 185 Pa. Super. 230, 137 A.2d 833 (1958).
227. 16 Pa. D.&C.2d. 489 (C.P. Alleg.), aff'd per curiam, 395 Pa. 380, 150 A.2d
530 (1959).
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grievances and claims of employees arising out of agreements
drawn in consonance with the Railway Labor Act must be presented before the National Railroad Adjustment Board." '
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act provides that the labor
board shall be empowered to prevent unfair labor practices. This Act
expressly directs that:
"This power shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that have been or
may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise."22
In Kohv v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board,'" an employer
summarily dismissed an employee for engaging in union activity. Three
days later, the union commenced picketing with striking employees.
Subsequently, the employer and union entered into an agreement which
settled the strike. The labor agreement recognized the union as bargaining agent. As part of the agreement, the union absolved the employer of liability for the unfair practice involved in the discriminatory
discharge previously committed. The court applied the labor board's
exclusive power to remedy unfair labor practices. It held in the Kohv
case that "a contract between an employer and a union which would
deprive a union member of individual rights guaranteed to him by the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act and existing prior to the date when
the union became his exclusive bargaining agent, is contrary to public
policy and unenforceable." In answer to the employer's argument that
settlement of labor controversies should be encouraged as a matter of
public policy, the court further held that:
"The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public
body, charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing
unfair labor practices. The public right and the duty extend not
only to the prevention of unfair labor practice by the employer in
the future, but to the prevention of his enjoyment of any advantage
which he has gained by violation of the Act, whether it be a company union or an unlawful contract with employees, as the means
of defeating the statutory policy and purpose."231
(3)

Requirement That Employee Be in the Unit.

An individual employee cannot bring an action to enforce a benefit
arising under the labor contract unless he is included within the bargaining unit for which the contract was negotiated. Thus in Gordon v.
228. 16 Pa. D.&C.2d at 492, 150 A.2d at 532.
229. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 43 P.S. § 211.8 (1952).
230. 6 Pa. D.&C.2d 250 (C.P. Mtgy. 1955).
231. Id. at 257.
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Braeburn Alloy Steel Company23 2 the court dismissed an action because
the employee was not included in the unit covered by the contract. In
the Gordon case a supervisory employee commenced an action against
his employer to recover wages allegedly wrongfully deducted. The
employee argued that these deductions were not permitted pursuant
to a labor contract then subsisting. The court did not question the
general right of an employee judicially to pursue his wage claim arising
under the provisions of the labor contract if such a claim existed. The
Gordon case did, however, expressly hold that the plaintiff's supervisory classification, under the terms of the labor contract, excluded
him from the bargaining unit. The plaintiff was therefore not covered
by the contract and the benefits under the contract did not flow to him.
A caveat is apropos at this point on the right of a former employee
to file a suit in equity pursuant to Pennsylvania law. Problems in this
respect arise where an employee has been discharged allegedly in violation of his seniority rights under the labor contract. Pennsylvania law
will limit such former employee to a cause of action at law. Equitable
relief, by means of mandatory reinstatement to the former employment,
is unavailable. The leading case on this point is McMenamin v. Philadelphia Transportation Company.2"' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in the McMenamin case that a former employee will fail in
his suit in equity to compel reinstatement to a job from which he had
been fired because of a wrongful discharge insofar as the seniority
provision of a labor contract is concerned. This case emphasizes the
distinction in Pennsylvania law between existing property rights which
have as their foundation a valid subsisting employment contract and
inchoate or potential rights which can ripen into actual existence by
an additional affirmative act, namely: either the creation or the reinstatement of an employment contract. A discharged person, whether
justly or unjustly severed from employment, thus was held in the
McMenamin case to have but inchoate or potential property rights.
Since equity will not take jurisdiction of matters in this area which
do not involve existing property rights, equity will not entertain a
suit brought by such discharged person for an injunction to compel his
reinstatement on the grounds that his seniority rights had been violated.
It is the serious conclusion of this author that the principle established by the McMenamin decision is impractical in its results and is
based on a somewhat tortured and devious application of the law. If
the law would be practical in this respect it would refrain from the
232. 364 Pa. 586, 73 A.2d 367 (1950).
233. 336 Pa. 88, 51 A.2d 702 (1947).
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hypertechnical approach of the McMenamin case. The remedy of
damages is not always a complete remedy in this area of labor law.
The many intangibles involved in employment rights are difficult to assess for their true values. If one grants, for the sake of
this phase of the discussion, that an employee has been discharged in
violation of his contract seniority guaranties, then the employee has
indeed lost very valuable present property rights. Equity has recognized pension, health and welfare rights as property rights. Therefore
if in fact the discharge is improper, why cannot equity perform its
traditional role in the law of the conscience of society and determine
that this employee has never, in essence, changed or lost his status as
a current employee? Why should the employer, who in our hypothetical case has wrongfully discharged under the seniority clause and
therefore comes into court with unclean hands, be afforded the fruits
of absolute victory by virtue of dismissal by equity of the employee's
suit on grounds of lack of jurisdiction? To be slightly facetious, this
equity principle is inequitable. It simply fails to afford a just result.
Damages in an action at law, on the other hand, are available
under Pennsylvania law for wrongful discharge in violation of seniority
234
rights under a labor contract.
O'Donnell v. City of Philadelphia235 is another case where the
issue involved the point as to whether the union and the employer
intended the benefits to flow to certain non-union members who were
not, as a matter of law or a matter of fact, a part of the bargaining
unit. The O'Donnell case held that incidental beneficiaries have no
cause of action under the terms of a labor contract, and the plaintiffs'
action therefore failed.
(4) Requirement To Join Indispensable Parties.
An indispensable party is one who is so directly interested in the
litigation that a final judgment or decree could not be entered without
inevitably affecting his interests, rights and duties so as to require
his joinder for a final determination of all the issues involved in the
action. 236 In other words, an indispensable party is really a party
without whom the action cannot proceed to final judgment or decree.
Failure to join an indispensable party is therefore a fatal procedural
error. 23 7 Our Pennsylvania courts have held that the rule of indis234. Wagner v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 16 Pa. D. & C. 489
(C.P. Alleg.) aff'd per cuniamn, 395 Pa. 380, 150 A.2d 530 (1959).
235. 385 Pa. 176, 122 A.2d 690 (1956).
236. Powell v. Shepard, 381 Pa. 405, 113 A.2d 261 (1955).
237. Forbes Rock Rd. Union Church v. Salvation Army, 381 Pa. 249, 113
A.2d 311 (1955).
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pensable parties goes to the very jurisdiction of the court and absent
the presence of such an indispensable party, the court will not assume
or retain jurisdiction of the subject matter.23 Hence, in Gavigan v.
Bookbinders Union No. 27,239 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held inter alia that the failure to join the employer as party defendant
was fatal to the action. The Gavigan case involved an action by
employee-members of a union brought against the union without joining the employer, for an interpretation of the seniority clause of the
labor contract. It was brought in order to safeguard the seniority
rights of these plaintiff-employees. On the other hand, in Kern v.
Duquesne Brewing Company of Pittsburgh,240 another action by employees involving labor contract seniority rights, where the local union
had been joined and no redress was being sought from either the international union or an employers' association, the court held that it was
241
not mandatory that the latter two be joined as "necessary parties.
VII.
SELECTED PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUITS BY AND AGAINST
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND EMPLOYERS PURSUANT
PENNSYLVANIA

TO THE

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

For the most part, the Pennsylvania procedural requirements are
identical for actions in law or suits in equity.
A. Juridical Status of Labor Unions.24 s
All of the following comments and analyses refer solely to labor
unions which are voluntary unincorporated associations.

The

PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

govern actions

at law or in equity by or against labor unions constituted as voluntary
238. Gavigan v. Bookbinders Union No. 97, 394 Pa. 400, 147 A.2d 147 (1959);
Kelley v. Kelley, 382 Pa. 537, 115 A.2d 202 (1955).
239. 394 Pa. 400, 147 A.2d 147 (1959).
240. 17 Pa. D.&C.2d 299 (C.P. Alleg.), aff'd per curiarn, 396 Pa. 279, 152 A.2d
682 (1959).
241. "Necessary" and "indispensible" parties have often been used interchangeably
by the Pennsylvania courts. The distinction between the two concepts is therefore at
best a hazy one. If a decree or a judgment cannot finally resolve the issue involved
without the presence of a certain party, such a party is "indispensable". On the other
hand in cases where parties cannot be served or joined, and the interests of such
parties are separable, it is more practical to litigate the matter to a conclusion than
to dismiss it. In the latter case, the party is a "necessary" but not an "indispensable"
party.

In

other words, the absence of a "necessary" party should not result in a

complete failure of the cause, whereas the absence of an "indispensable" party
should.
242. The summary of Pennsylvania law on the juridical status of labor unions is
taken in part from a previous article on this subject by the author. Stern, IntraUnion Activities. Membership and Collective Bargaining Rights under Pennsylvania
Law, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 38, 40-41 (1955).
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unincorporated associations. 43 An unincorporated labor union, as such,
must mandatorily be sued as an entity, eo nosninee; or by means of an
action against an officer of the union as "trustees ad litem.' '2 44 Suits 2by
4
or against labor organizations cannot be brought as a class action. 1
An action by the labor union must be prosecuted in a representative
form, i.e., in the name of an officer or a member or members of the
union as "trustees ad liten.

2 46

An action may be instituted as an action at law by a labor union
against one or more of its members, or by one or more of its members
against the labor union. In this respect an independent basis must be
found for equitable actions. 47
The venue of action against labor unions, with a few stated
exceptions, is a local one. Thus an action may be brought in, and only
in, the county where the union regularly conducts business or activities,
or where the cause of action arose, or where a transaction out of which
a cause of action arose 248 took place.
A judgment entered against a union sued in the name of the union
or in its name by a trustee ad litem, binds the union's assets and supports execution thereon.2 49 An individual member must be named as an
additional defendant in order to impose individual liability upon him. 2 5
B. Service of Process.
Service of process should also be explored in passing. Quinn v.
Pershing2

1

involved service upon non-residents, and the precise issue

243. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 12 P.S. Appendix, Rules 21512175 (1951). The Rules will hereinafter be cited "Pa. R.C.P. Rule (1951)."
This citation would therefore read, "Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2151-2175 (1951)."
244. Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2153 (1951).
245. The official rules committee note on Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2230 reads: "Suits by
or against unincorporated associations are not to be brought as class suits under this
rule. Such suits are not regulated by Pa. R.C.P. Rules 2152 and 2153, 12 P.S.
Appendix." See 3 GOODRICH-AMRAM, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, §§ 2152-2

(1953) ; 4

ANDERSON,

PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL PRACTICE

1954 (1950).

Accord, Under-

wood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1958).
246. Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2152 (1951). The Rule provides that an action so prosecuted
shall be entitled, "X Ass'n by A and B, Trustees Ad Litem" against the party defendant. Trustees ad litem may be officers or ordinary members of the union; but
the action cannot be brought in the name of the union alone. 4 ANDERSON, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE 195-196 (1950).
247. Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2145 (1951).
This is a procedural rule and does not
negate such requirements as exhaustion of internal remedies. 4 ANDERSON, PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL PRACTICE

200 (1950).

Nor does it enlarge substantive rights or create

any rights of action which did not previously in such case exist. Walsh v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 71 Dauph., 333 (C.P. Pa. 1958).
248. Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2156 (1951). The exceptions involve attachment, seizure,
garnishment, sequestration or condemnation or an action to. recover possession of or
to determine title to real or personal property.
249. Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2153 (1951).
250. Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2153 (1951). 3 G0ODRIcII-AMRAM, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 2153(c)-2 (1953).
251. 367 Pa. 426, 80 A.2d 712 (1951).
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arose concerning service of process upon a union officer in charge of a
regional office although that officer was not a registered agent. The
court held that a valid service upon him had been made pursuant to
PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 2157. The court
in the Quinn case dismissed the argument that this result would violate
due process.
Spica v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union252 is a
leading recent decision which establishes standards inherent in "doing
business" or the meaning of "association activity" under Pennsylvania
law for service of process. In the Spica case, the court held that an
international union with main offices in New York, was amenable to
service of process made on an officer of a joint board located in Philadelphia. Some specific facts which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
found persuasive in determining that the service of process was valid
may be of interest and therefore follow: The International Union had
the ultimate power to determine grievances, conduct finances, and supervise strikes. These facts evidenced to the court that the joint board was
a creature of the International Union and effectuated its objects. The
court noted, inter alia, that:
"The name of the International is displayed across the entire
front of the building . . .whereas . . .the Joint Board appears
only on the door; the dues cards carry the signature of the President of the International Union . . .the letterhead of the Joint
Board bears the official seal of the International, . . .organizing
activities ...have been carried on in the name of the International,
or both . . . ; a very constant stream of communication was carried on between the North Broad Street office (in Philadelphia)
and the offices in New York City, . . . a per capita ...payment
was regularly collected by the North Broad Street office and transmitted to the New York office; auditors selected and employed by
the New York office regularly audit books ...in Philadelphia; ...
a (labor) contract bears the signature .. .not only of the former
manager of the Joint Board, but also that of Dave Dubinsky,
'253
President of the International.
VIII.
CONCLUSION.

The very strength of the common law, with regard to its stability
and predictability, has been a source of weakness in the law of labor
contracts. It has resulted in rather slow, measured changes in Penn252. 388 Pa. 382, 130 A.2d 468 (1957).
253. Id. at 391-93, 130 A.2d at 473-74.
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sylvania law on collective bargaining agreements when basic and speedy
changes were the order of the day. The greatest recent forward strides
have been paced by legislative action, which fortunately has been more
sympathetic and responsive to the real needs. Pennsylvania public policy
now unequivocally mandates that collective bargaining and the making
and enforcing of its resultant labor agreements should be encouraged.
Inherent in this approach is the end rule that enforcement of the
labor agreement should be governed wherever possible by the internal
machinery for its enforcement.
That enforcement by individual members should be discouraged
unless fraud or corrupt agreement has reared its ugly head is clearly
evident. Objective and fair effectuation of the labor agreement is
thereby rendered impossible.2" 4 Enforcement by judicial process, in
any event, should be the exception rather than the rule. But whether
by means of grievance or other extra-legal machinery established by
the terms of the labor contract, or by means of actions at law or suits in
equity, a valid subsisting labor agreement should under all circumstances be considered and treated as an inviolate, enforceable, and
legally binding agreement.
254. This salutary rule that a union is entitled to exercise its honest discretion
and independent judgment has been applied in two trial court opinions. Chaco v.
Pittsburgh Steel Co., 105 PIrTs. L.J. 429 (C.P. Pa. 1957) ; DiSanti v. United Glass
and Ceramic Workers Union, 37 Wash. 258 (Pa. 1957).
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